Introduction
Cyber warfare is making headlines very frequently worldwide. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is one of the common tools being used in today's Cyber warfare and to compromise legitimate online transactions. Recent target of such coordinated attacks have been Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Sony PlayStation network, Master Card etc. just to name few, whose websites were brought down by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and in some cases customers' confidential information were compromised. According to the research reports and surveys conducted by from Arbor Networks [1] , thousands of DDoS attacks were happening every day and intensity of attack is increasing rapidly. In 2013, the DDoS attack intensity was found to exceed 300 Gbps, which was three times the maximum attack intensity observed in 2012. Internet is omnipresent in today's information society including health care facilities and hospitals. DDoS attacks on Internet connected health care facilities can also lead to failure of proper health care in our society [2] . Servers are the backbone of today's Internet driven data centers, and bringing down these servers can result in significant disruption of today's Cyber driven society. Furthermore, 71% of data center operators reported DDoS attacks in 2013, which was up 45% from 2012 [1] . To understand the effectiveness of security protections, in this paper, we evaluate two commonly deployed Microsoft's Windows servers, namely Windows 2003 and Windows 2008 servers, and their built-in security capabilities to protect against a common DDoS attack called TCP/SYN flood attack. This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a brief background on DDoS attacks, especially on TCP/SYN attack. Section III gives information about experimental setup and default systems configurations of the servers under test. Section VI presents results and discussion, and Section V is conclusion.
Background
DDoS attacks are increasing both in terms of frequency and attack intensity. DDoS attacks have been found to occur with increasing intensity-largest intensity was reported to be 100 Gbps in 2010 and in 2013 the largest intensity was reported to be over 300 Gbps [1] . There are different types of DDoS attacks; however, most work by flooding a large amount of illegitimate traffic towards the victim server that causes denial of service to legitimate users by consuming all of the available recourses of the victim computer such as Memory depletion, Processor exhaustion or Bandwidth consumption [2] - [6] . Some DDoS attacks can also be caused by sending small amount of traffic to exploit a given vulnerability on the victim computer/server [7] .
TCP/SYN Flood Attack
A TCP/SYN flood is one of the common mechanisms used by hackers to launch DDoS attacks. This occurs when an attacker remotely uses its Botnets to send a flood of TCP/SYN packets, often with forged IP addresses towards a victim server/computer. The victim server/computer treats TCP/SYN packets like a normal connection requests, creates half-open connections, and sends back acknowledgement packets called TCP/SYN-ACK packets for every TCP/SYN packets received. The victim server waits for a response from the senders. Since the senders' IP addresses are forged, the follow up response never comes. The half-open connections created at the victim computer saturate the number of available connections that the server can make, and thus limiting the total number of legitimate connections that can be established.
For every TCP-SYN packet that is received, the victim computer allocates TCB resources before establishing a complete connection by following 3-way handshake process. Continuous flood of TCP-SYN packets lead to ever increasing allocation of TCB resources and thus resulting in exhaustion of resources of a victim computer [8] [9] . Normally TCB requires 280 Bytes and in some operating systems up-to 1300 Bytes depending on the complexity of the TCP algorithms and options used. If an attacker sends continuous flood of TCP-SYN packets with spoofed IP address then the targeted server replies to the spoofed IP with a SYN-ACK and reserves some resources for the client and waits for final ACK. For a high-load of attack traffic, in no time, the resource of the targeted victim server can be completely consumed resulting in Denial of Service for the legitimate users.
Default Inbuilt Prevention against TCP/SYN Attack
For Windows 2003 server with Service Pack2, there is a built-in security feature provided by the operating system called "Syn Attack Protect", which is enabled by default for Windows Servers 2003 with Service Packs installed. This protection reduces the amount of retransmissions of the SYN-ACKS, which also reduces the allocated memory for TCB entry resources for the incoming SYN segment until the full connection is established after completing three-way handshake process. And, this protection mechanism is activated when the Tcp MaxHalf Open and Tcp Max Half Open Retried threshold levels are exceeded [10] [11] . Tcp Max Half Open is a parameter which manages the number of connections in the SYN-Received (SYN-RCVD) state before the SynAttack Protect protection begins to functions, and by default, this threshold is set to 500 in Windows Server Enterprise Edition. And Tcp Max Half Open Retried is a parameter which manages the number of connections in SYN-RCVD state for which one retransmission of SYN segment has to be sent, before the Syn Attack Protect begins to function. Regarding Windows 2008, it appears to be tuned by default for performance and protection, such that modification of these registry entries doesn't provide the same performance benefits that have been observed on Windows Server 2003 [11] [12].
Experimental Setup
In From Figure 2 , it is observed that the number of connections which were 20,000/sec in the absence of any TCP/SYN attack (i.e. zero attack load which forms the baseline) continues to decline as the attack traffic increased. The number of legitimate connections continued to decline with increase in attack load, i.e. from a baseline of 20,000 connections/sec and eventually reached to zero connections at an attack load of 6 Mbps of TCP/SYN attack traffic. At 5 Mbps of TCP/SYN attack traffic load, the connections were brought down to 6000 connections/sec. Interestingly, when the load was further increased to 6 Mbps, the server was found to have crashed resulting in zero connections to legitimate users.
Protection Provided by Microsoft Windows
To understand the cause of the crash, a relatively higher load of 10 Mbps of TCP/SYN attack traffic was sent again to the Windows 2008 Server with SP-1, and it was found that Microsoft Windows Server 2008 crashed rather due to rapid depletion of the memory, whereas the processor was not consumed completely. Figure 4 shows a snapshot of rapid memory depletion causing the Windows 2008 Server to crash in less than 60 seconds.
Comparison of two different Windows Servers under TCP/SYN attack traffic is shown in Table 1 . -1 ) was found to crash also at 6 Mbps of TCP/SYN attack traffic however the crash was due to the memory depletion rather than the complete processor exhaustion, which resulted in zero legitimate connections for the users. The experimental evaluations presented in this paper shows that the built-in security capability of Windows servers are not sufficient to withstand TCP/SYN based DDoS attacks on their own. It is important for the server farm operators to not rely solely on the host-based, built-in protection provided by the Microsoft's Windows servers.
Additional security systems such as intrusion prevention systems must be deployed strategically on the periphery of the network to allow security protection against DDoS attacks.
